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ABSTRACT: On October 3rd, 2014, the European Commission (EC) concluded the 
analysis of the transaction by which Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”, USA) had acquired 
WhatsApp Inc. (“WhatsApp”, USA) by way of a purchase of shares for US$ 19 billion, 
which contributed to Facebook’s strategy of focusing its business on mobile devel-
opment (Case no. COMP/M.7217). In its decision, the EC stated that the deal would 
raise no competition concerns and authorised the proposed acquisition of WhatsApp 
by Facebook concluding that Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp are not close com-
petitors and that consumers would continue to have a wide choice of alternatives for 
consumer communication apps after the acquisition. The EC analysed potential data 
concentration issues only within the scope that the acquisition could weigh down 
competition in the online advertising market. Privacy-related concerns from the 
increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook because of the deal 
with WhatsApp are not an EU Competition Law matter. Notwithstanding, just some 
months after the decision two national competition authorities (Germany and Italy) 
opened procedures against Facebook. In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt initiated in 
March 2016 a proceeding against Facebook – Facebook Inc., USA, the Irish subsidi-
ary of the company, and Facebook Germany GmbH, Hamburg – on suspicion that 
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Facebook had abused its market power by infringing data protection rules with its 
specific terms of service on the use of user data. In Italy, in May 2017, the Autorità 
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) fined WhatsApp EUR 3 million 
for having forced its users to share their personal data with Facebook as a conclu-
sion of two investigations opened in October 2016 concerning infringements of the 
Consumer Code. The present article proposes to answer three main questions con-
cerning the EC decision on the WhatsApp acquisition by Facebook: (i) Did the EC 
apply the best tools to analyse the case?; (ii) Could the EC have addressed a decision 
that would somehow interfere in the privacy field?; and (iii) Could the procedures in 
Germany and Italy have been avoided?
KEYWORDS: Facebook; WhatsApp; Big Data; Competition Law; Privacy; Data 
Protection.
1. Introduction
Competing in or for the markets, companies are making acquisitions to 
increase their product or service lines and acquiring new technologies or 
assets to boost their market power or simply to restrict competition from 
potential competitors who in any way pose a threat to their business.
In the Digital Economy,1 where competition in digital markets has its 
own characteristics, including trends such as “winner takes all”, network 
effects, two-sided markets, multi-sided markets, platforms,2 fast-paced 
innovation and high sums of investment, data represents an important 
asset to any company for dealing with a variety of data and in diverse 
forms. An enormous set of digital data3 held by companies, governments 
and organizations which analyses extensively through algorithms4 is 
known as Big Data.
If applied in the correct technologies, Big Data can anticipate and 
solve business problems by knowing consumers better and foreseeing 
1 OECD, The Digital Economy, 2012, 5.
2 J. S. Frank, Competition Concerns in Multi-Sided Markets in Mobile Communication. In G. 
Surblyté, Competition on the Internet. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
vol. 23 (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 85.
3 OECD (2015), Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being, OECD Publishing, 
Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264229358-en, 450.
4 R. Cumbley and P. Church, “Is big data creepy?”, Computer Law & Security Review 29 (2013), 
601-609.
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opportunities, thus becoming more competitive. The data generated every 
second can be structured data, those with pre-established strict standards, 
or unstructured data,5 such as emails, images, videos, audio, and docu-
ments. This data can increase the exposure of personal privacy,6 corporate 
information and secrets of States.7 As the executive office of the president 
of the United States stated, “used well, big data analysis can boost eco-
nomic productivity, drive improved consumer and government services, 
thwart terrorists, and save lives”.8 
Since its beginning in 2001,9 Big Data has been identified as a 3 V’s 
model, but especially from a legal perspective of analysis, Big Data adopted 
other three characteristics10 and can be better identified for its virtuosity 
as a 6 V’s model.
The 6 V’s model that describes Big Data is: (i) volume (great volume) gen-
eration and mass data capture; (ii) velocity (rapid generation, processing of 
data) the rapid data capture opportunity to maximise its usefulness; (iii) 
variety (various modalities, types of data) the various data formats, namely, 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured; (iv) value, which means to 
extract value from a huge volume of data through high-speed in the cap-
ture and analysis; (v) veracity, the reliability of the data obtained to ensure 
the truth in their analysis to obtain accurate information; and (vi) valida-
tion, the ability to assure that multiple data sources when grouped together 
make sense.11
5 J. Fishleigh, A Non-Technical Journey into the World of Big Data: An Introduction (Cambridge: 
Legal Information Management, 2014), 150.
6 T. Craig and M. E. Ludloff, Privacy and Big Data (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly, 2011).
7 H. Moon and H. S. Cho, “Big data and policy design for data sovereignty: A case study on copy-
right and CCL in South Korea”, Social Com, 2013, 1026-1029.
8 The White House: Executive Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving 
Values, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_
report_may_1_2014.pdf, 5.
9 M. Chen, S. Mao, Y. Zhang and V.C.M. Leung, Big Data: Related Technologies, Challenges and 
Future Prospects (London: Springer, 2014), 3-4.
10 C. Agnellutti, Big Data: An Exploration of Opportunities, Values and Privacy Issues (New York: 
Nova Science Pub Inc., 2014).
11 In 2017 Tom Shafer published in the Elder Research blog that the world now operates in an 
ever more sophisticated world of analytics, and to keep up with the times, he has presented an 
updated 2017 list: The 42 V’s of Big Data and Data Science. The vast list, notwithstanding, seems 
an overstatement and consists in many V’s that do not represent the V’s for characterising the Big 
Data, especially from a legal perspective, such as: Version Control; Vet; Vexed; Vibrant; Viral; 
Vogue; Voodoo; Voyage; and Vulpine. Accessed November 21, 2018. https://www.elderresearch.
com/company/blog/42-v-of-big-data. 
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As explained by the OECD,12 the collaborative arrangements of firms 
combining their individual offerings to create coherent, customer-tailored 
solutions in Big Data as the data ecosystem is seen as “a combination of 
layers corresponding to key roles of actors, where the underlying layers 
provide goods and services to the upper layers”. The global data ecosystem 
is growing fast due to the increasing number of players, many of them 
playing multiple roles in the Big Data market. According to a report by the 
International Data Corporation (IDC) and Open Evidence,13 the value of 
the data market in Europe, estimated in EUR 60 billion in 2016, will be of 
EUR 106 billion in 2020, impacting the entire continental economy, which 
will reach 4% of the GDP.
The importance of the competitive advantages of data linked with data 
collection and exploitation is a significant subject, where the role of infor-
mation flowing through them and how it gets translated into decisions can 
be understood as the key difference between conventional markets and the 
data-rich ones.14 
The network effects15 and the evolution of the digital economy with its 
dynamic competition is based on continuous cycles of innovation, devel-
opment and ruptures, as well as market concentration, involving differ-
ent players with dominant positions. This has led to a growing imbalance 
between large companies on the one hand, and small and medium-sized 
businesses and consumers on the other.
Personal data as an asset can be comprehended in two perspectives: 
from the consumer side and from the business side.
The refusal by a consumer to accept the terms and conditions that are 
imposed by a company for the access and use of a product, such as an 
app, may result in that consumer no longer relating to other people, which 
means that someone could be excluded from social networks or even kept 
apart from professional relations. 
12 OECD (2015), Data-Driven Innovation, 34.
13 “Big data: Interim report in the context of the joint inquiry on ‘Big data’ launched by the 
AGCOM deliberation No. 217/17 / CONS17”. 2018. Accessed November 27. 2018. https://
www.agcom.it/documents/10179/10875949/Allegato+4-9-2018/f9befcb1-4706-4daa-ad38-
c0d767add5fd?version=1.0, III.
14 V. Mayer-Schönberger and T. Ramge, Reinventing Capitalism in the Age of Big Data (New York: 
Basic Books, 2018), 7.
15 S. Vezzoso, “Internet competition and e-books: Challenging the competition policy acquis?”, in 
G. Surblyté, Competition on the Internet. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law, vol. 23, Berlin: Springer, 2015, 33.
M&CLR_III_1.indd   18 23/05/2019   15:49:09
19Questions that Have Arisen since the EU Decision on the Whatsapp Acquisition by Facebook | Vicente Bagnoli
The NY Times stated that in the age of internet capitalism people are in 
an inescapable thrall to one of the handful of American technology com-
panies that now dominate much of the global economy, referred to by the 
newspaper as the Frightful Five: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and 
Alphabet, the holding company of Google. “Their growth has prompted 
calls for greater regulation and antitrust intervention”.16
The business perspective empowered by mergers, acquisitions and 
market dominance, especially platforms, directly affects competition of 
smaller players, which can hardly compete with those players that act on 
different levels of the market and have Big Data in their benefit.17 
Data is the commodity that spawns a lucrative, fast-growing industry, 
which prompts antitrust regulators to step in to restrain those who con-
trol its flow, as reported in The Economist. The giants that deal in data, 
the oil of the digital era, are Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Facebook 
and Microsoft, the world’s five most valuable listed companies. “Their 
profits are surging: they collectively racked up over $25bn in net profit in 
the first quarter of 2017. Amazon captures half of all dollars spent online 
in America. Google and Facebook accounted for almost all the revenue 
growth in digital advertising in America last year”.18
The circumstances in which a company – especially with existing market 
power – controls the collection of consumer data in a market where data 
is a considerable input into the products/services produced is undoubtedly 
the most worrying for end users and in some specific circumstances may 
warrant antitrust intervention.19 Nevertheless, as noticed by the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS),20 the truth is that “A full market anal-
ysis for any of the ‘free’ digital services has yet to be carried out”. 
This summarises why companies have decided to merge or why com-
panies are acquired in the Digital Economy. These preliminary remarks 
16 “Tech’s Frightful Five: They’ve Got Us”, The NY Times, May 10, 2017. Accessed May 30, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/technology/techs-frightful-five-theyve-got-us.html?_r=0. 
17 V. Bagnoli, “Competition for the effectiveness of big data benefits”, International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 46, no. 6 (2015): 629-631.
18 “The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data”, The Economist, May 6, 2017. 
Accessed May 21, 2017. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-
demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource.
19 G. Pitruzzella, “Big data, competition and privacy: A look from the antitrust perspective”. 
Concorrenza e Mercato, 23 (2016), special edition Big Data e Concorrenza, 15-27.
20 EDPS, “Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor Privacy and 
Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law 
and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy”, 2014, 26.
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will help comprehend some reasons that drove Case M. 7217 itself and 
the questions that have arisen since the EU decision on the Facebook/
WhatsApp acquisition.
2. Case M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition
On August 29th, 2014, the European Commission (EC) received a notifica-
tion of the proposed concentration by which Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”, 
USA) had acquired WhatsApp Inc. (“WhatsApp”, USA) by way of a share 
purchase of US$ 19 billion, which contributed to Facebook’s strategy of 
focusing its business on mobile development.21
Facebook is a provider of websites and applications for mobile devices 
(“apps”) offering social networking, consumer communications and 
photo/video sharing functions, and provides online advertising space. It 
offers the social networking platform called “Facebook”, the consumer 
communications app “Facebook Messenger” and the photo and video-
sharing platform “Instagram”. WhatsApp is a provider of consumer com-
munications services via the mobile app called “WhatsApp”, but does not 
sell advertising space. 
The Commission’s analysis focused on three sectors: (i) consumer com-
munications services, (ii) social networking services, and (iii) online 
advertising services.
Consumer communications services are multimedia communications 
solutions that allow people to reach other contacts in real time. At the 
beginning those services were developed and offered as software applica-
tions for personal computers (“PCs”), but were progressively shifted away 
from PCs towards smart mobile devices, especially smartphones and tab-
lets, becoming “consumer communications apps” that enable communica-
tion in various forms, such as voice and multimedia (text, photo or video) 
21 Pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) no. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EU Merger Regulation), in its Article 3.1 a concentration shall be deemed to 
arise where a change of control on a lasting basis results from: (a) the merger of two or more previ-
ously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings, or (b) the acquisition, by one or more 
persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by 
purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or indirect control of 
the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. Following a referral pursuant to Article 4.5 
with regard to a concentration as defined in Article 3 which does not have a Community dimen-
sion within the scope of Article 1 and which is capable of being reviewed under the national com-
petition laws of at least three Member States, the persons or undertakings referred to in paragraph 
2 may, before any notification to the competent authorities, inform the Commission by means of a 
reasoned submission that the concentration should be examined by the Commission.
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messaging, video chat, group chat, voice call, and sharing of location. 
Consumer communications services can be related to “free goods”, since 
many of those apps are “zero cost” for consumers. 
Social networking services are usually defined as services which allow 
users to connect, share, communicate and express themselves online or 
through a mobile app, usually provided without any monetary charges – 
“free products”, but normally monetised through advertising, charges for 
premium services and, it is important to highlight, through personal data.
Facebook’s activities in online advertising services consist in the pro-
vision of services on Facebook’s social networking platform but did not 
include any ads on Facebook Messenger app at the time of the EC’s analy-
sis on the Facebook/WhatsApp deal. 
On October 3rd, 2014, the EC concluded that the deal would raise no com-
petition concerns and authorised the proposed acquisition of WhatsApp 
by Facebook ruling that Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp were not 
close competitors and that consumers would continue to have a wide 
choice of alternative for consumer communications apps after the merger. 
The EC22 observed that consumer communications apps are character-
ised by network effects, the analysis of the proposed acquisition showed 
that Facebook and WhatsApp even as one entity would continue to face 
enough competition after the deal.
3. Sizing up the EU decision on the Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition
The European Commission (EC) decision on the Facebook/WhatsApp23-24 
acquisition “decided not to oppose the Transaction and to declare it com-
patible with the internal market and with the EEA Agreement”25 focused 
on three sectors considered significant, defining the relevant market as: (i) 
consumer communications services; (ii) social networking; and (iii) online 
advertising services.
22 “Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook”, 2014, under “Press 
Release Database”, Press-release_IP-14-1088. Accessed June 01, 2018. http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-14-1088_en.htm.
23 Commission decision of 6 October 2014, pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 
139/2004, Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/merg-
ers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf. 
24 In the published version of the decision used for the analysis and development of the present 
article, some information has been omitted pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 139/2004 concerning non-disclosure of business secrets and other confidential information.
25 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 191.
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The EC focused its consumer communications services assessment 
on apps for smartphones and concluded that Facebook Messenger and 
WhatsApp are not close competitors since Facebook Messenger is a stan-
dalone app integrated with the Facebook social network and WhatsApp 
access is provided through phone numbers. Despite their popularity, both 
WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger already have large customer bases. 
The EC26 observed that a number of factors mitigate the network effects 
in this particular case: (i) the consumer communications apps market is 
fast growing and characterised by short innovation cycles in which market 
positions are often rearranged; (ii) launching a new app is reasonably sim-
ple and does not require significant time and investment; and (iii) custom-
ers can and do use multiple apps at the same time and can switch from one 
app to another without difficulty.
The EC concluded that the company’s market boundaries of social net-
working services are continuously evolving, and Facebook and WhatsApp 
are, if anything, distant competitors in this area, and “whether or not 
WhatsApp is considered a social network, competition is unlikely to be 
negatively affected by the merger of such services”.27
Finally, the ruling determined that even though WhatsApp is not active 
in the online advertising market, if Facebook were to introduce advertis-
ing on WhatsApp and/or start collecting WhatsApp user data, the merger 
would not raise competition concerns since: (i) a sufficient number of 
alternative providers to Facebook for the supply of targeted advertising 
would be still available; and (ii) Facebook does not have exclusive control 
over a large amount of internet user data that is valuable for advertising 
purposes. 
It is worthwhile to highlight that the investigation conducted by the EC 
analysed potential data concentration issues only to the scope that they 
could weigh down competition in the online advertising market. Any 
privacy-related concerns from the increased concentration of data within 
the control of Facebook as a result of the deal with WhatsApp were not an 
issue for EU competition law. 
26 Press-release_IP-14-1088.
27 Press-release_IP-14-1088.
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3.1. Consumer communications services
The EC determined market segmentation by functionality, by plat-
form or by operating system. The most relevant for the evaluation of the 
deal Facebook/WhatsApp is segmentation based on platforms because 
WhatsApp is offered only for smartphones and there are no plans to expand 
its offering to other platforms. Therefore, as the EC noted, “the present case 
can be assessed on the basis of a relevant product market including only 
consumer communications apps for smartphones”.28 
The EC’s analysis pointed out that different services such as text mes-
saging, photo or video messaging or calls may take different approaches to 
facilitating consumer communications. This, however, does not put those 
services into different markets or market segments, and there was a range 
of competitors whose functionalities greatly overlapped with those offered 
by Facebook and WhatsApp. 
The EC assessed the effects of the deal in the narrowest relevant product 
market for consumer communications services when they employed the 
market for consumer communications apps for smartphones. Consumer 
communications apps are mainly offered free of charge and not priced per 
messages. They considered that the combined position of Facebook and 
WhatsApp would be attenuated in a market including traditional elec-
tronic communications services such as voice calls, SMS, MMS, or e-mails.
It is necessary to highlight that no mention was made by the EC of big 
data and its impact on consumer communications apps for smartphones. 
The geographic market definition for consumer communications apps 
also did not consider that certain consumer communications apps enjoy 
a greater reach than others in certain world regions. This is contrary to 
the analysis conducted by the EC which revealed that no major differ-
ences existed in the offering of consumer communications apps across the 
world. The consumer communications apps offered do not differ depend-
ing on the region or country concerned, either in terms of price, func-
tionalities, platforms or operating system. “In this context, while there are 
indications that the geographic scope of the consumer communications 
apps market could be global, the Commission considers that the relevant 
geographic market for the assessment of the case is EEA-wide in line with 
a more conservative approach”.29 
28 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 21.
29 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 40.
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Once again it needs to be emphasised that no mention was made by the 
EC of big data and its concerns to consumer communications apps for 
smartphones. If there are substitutes among apps, one should evaluate 
the characteristics of a digital economy, such as the “network effects”’ and 
the transaction costs to replace an app even at “zero cost” for consumers. 
These may all characterise a barrier to entry and the existence of a domi-
nant position.
The analysis of the EC on the competitive assessment of consumer com-
munication services considered that Facebook and WhatsApp operate two 
consumer communications apps, Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp 
itself. These are in competition with several other players worldwide such 
as LINE, Viber, Threema, Telegram, Snapchat and WeChat. These play-
ers in turn compete with companies that provide smartphone hardware 
and operating systems as Apple with iMessage, BlackBerry with BBM, 
Samsung with ChatON, Google with Google Hangouts and the Android 
messaging platform, Microsoft with Skype.
The competitive interaction between consumer communications apps 
appears to be an attempt to offer the best communication experience and 
a cultivation of improvement seeking the largest user base that is a key 
innovation driver. 
On the one hand, a consumer communications app is perceived as a 
trend amongst users and an important factor in attracting other users, 
which shapes the competitive environment. On the other hand, price is a 
factor that strongly contributes to the popularity of a consumer commu-
nications app given that users in general are very price-sensitive since they 
expect a free app.
At this point, one can perceive a strong correlation between “net effect” 
and “free products”.
The EC ruled that high market shares were not necessarily indicative 
of market power. They determined no lasting damage to competition due 
to the recent and fast-growing sector, which is characterised by frequent 
market entry and short innovation cycles.
This contradicts the figures30 that show that the combined share of 
Facebook and WhatsApp in the EEA market for consumer communi-
cations apps on iOS and Android smartphones in the period between 
November 2013 and May 2014 was around [30-40]% (WhatsApp: [20-30]%; 
30 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 99.
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Facebook Messenger: [10-20]%), followed by Android’s messaging plat-
form ([5-10]%), Skype ([5-10]%), Twitter ([5-10]%), Google Hangouts ([5-
10]%), iMessage ([5-10]%), Viber ([5-10]%), Snapchat ([0-5]%) and other 
market players with a share of [0-5]% or less. 
The EC concluded that consumers’ ability to switch providers implied 
no significant costs which could prevent consumers from changing among 
different consumer communications apps. However, switching providers 
may not be as easy in terms of convenience due to the need for users to 
reconstruct their network.
The consumer communications apps market has been characterised 
by disruptive innovation and there are no significant conventional barri-
ers to entry for a new consumer communications app to be accessible for 
download. 
Some information collected by the analysis developed by the EC indi-
cated that barriers to entry would be represented by a lack of data portabil-
ity and interoperability among consumer communications apps. However, 
the EC remarks that the deal would have an impact on the interoperabil-
ity issues only if Facebook decided to merge the two platforms or allowed 
cross-platform communication. 
Finally, the EC concluded that the Facebook/WhatsApp deal does not 
give rise to serious compatibility doubts in the EU internal market con-
cerning the market for consumer communications apps. 
3.2. Social networking
Facebook’s social networking service consists of: (i) user profile (user online 
identity), information about jobs, schools and universities attended, rela-
tionship status, birthday, life events and likes and interests such as music 
and movies; (ii) newsfeed, which consists of regularly updated personalised 
stories such as posts, photos, friends information, pages and entities that 
the user is connected to; and (iii) timeline, which allows users to organise 
and display events and activities such as interests, photos, education, work 
history, relationship status, and contact information. WhatsApp is not 
active in social networking and is notably focused on facilitating fast and 
simple communications between and among users. Other entrepreneurs 
in social networking service are Google+, LinkedIn, MySpace, Pinterest 
and InterNations.
The differences in social networking services and consumer communi-
cations apps are becoming indistinct since each service adopts traditional 
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functionalities of the other such as exchanging content of text messages, 
video, audio and photos. But the reasoning of the EC states that “on a gen-
eral level, social networking services tend to offer a richer social experi-
ence as compared to consumer communications apps”.31 
Following this line of thought, the conclusion on product market defini-
tion adopted by the EC was that since the Facebook/WhatsApp deal would 
not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal mar-
ket under any alternative market definition, a potential market can be left 
open.
The geographic market definition the EC adopted was a more conserva-
tive approach to consider the EEA-wide market for social networking ser-
vices, even with indications that it could be global.
The competitive assessment analysis by the EC observed that Facebook 
operates – at the time of the analysis – the world’s largest social network, 
which connects over 1.3 billion users worldwide and from 200 to 300 mil-
lion in the EEA.
If consumer communications apps such as WhatsApp are included in 
the market for social networking services, the number of alternative ser-
vice providers is high. Notwithstanding, the EC concluded that these pro-
viders are not close competitors in the potential market for social network-
ing services due to the significant differences between the functionalities 
and the focus of Facebook and WhatsApp.
It is important to highlight that the EC considered that the integration of 
WhatsApp could strengthen Facebook’s position in the potential market 
for social networking services. However, as evidenced during the analysis 
nothing supported a future integration and, in any event, an integration 
of WhatsApp with Facebook would be mitigated by the fact that many 
WhatsApp’s active users are already users of Facebook eliminating any 
potential net gain in terms of new members.
In sum, the EC considered that the deal Facebook/WhatsApp “would 
not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal mar-
ket as regards the potential market for the provision of social networking 
services”.32 
31 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 54.
32 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 163.
M&CLR_III_1.indd   26 23/05/2019   15:49:10
27Questions that Have Arisen since the EU Decision on the Whatsapp Acquisition by Facebook | Vicente Bagnoli
3.3. Online advertising services
Facebook collects and analyses data on the users of its social networking 
platform to provide advertisements on behalf of advertisers. Each user is 
targeted, but the data is neither sold nor does Facebook provide data ana-
lytics services to advertisers or other third parties as a separate product 
from the advertising space itself.
During the time of the investigation WhatsApp did not sell any form of 
advertising or store or collect data on its users that would be valuable for 
advertising purposes, besides messages that are not stored in WhatsApp’s 
servers, but only on the users’ mobile devices or chosen cloud.
The reasoning of the EC on the provision of data or data analytics ser-
vices was not to investigate any possible market definition since neither 
Facebook nor WhatsApp were active in such both potential markets. 
The conclusion on product market definition adopted by the EC was 
that online advertising constitutes a relevant market separate from offline 
advertising and “whether segments of that market constitute relevant 
markets in their own right can be left open for the purposes of this deci-
sion, because the Transaction would not give rise to serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market under any such narrower product 
market definition”.33 
The reasoning of the EC in geographic market definition was to define 
the online advertising market and its possible sub-segments as national 
in scope or alongside linguistic borders within the EEA. They considered 
that some factors such as customers’ – purchasing preferences, customers’ 
languages and the presence of support and sales networks were located at 
the national level.
The competitive assessment analysis developed by the EC considered the 
potential data concentration to reinforce Facebook’s position in the online 
advertising market or in any sub-segments thereof. 
It is important to observe that the EC considered that any privacy-related 
concerns from the increased concentration of data within the control of 
Facebook because of the deal with WhatsApp would be the scope of the 
EU data protection rules and not a matter of EU competition law rules. 
Since WhatsApp was not a player in the provision of online advertis-
ing services, no horizontal overlap was verified. Furthermore, considering 
that WhatsApp neither collects data on its users nor stores the content of 
33 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 79.
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messages, non-valuable data for advertising purposes is generated, mean-
ing that the deal does not increase the amount of data potentially avail-
able to Facebook for advertising purposes. Nevertheless, to verify if the 
deal with WhatsApp could increase Facebook’s position in the online 
advertising market the EC analysed two main possible theories of harm: 
(i) introducing advertising on WhatsApp, and/or (ii) using WhatsApp as 
a potential source of user data for improving the targeting of Facebook’s 
advertising activities outside WhatsApp.
The possible theory of harm of introducing advertising on WhatsApp 
could be possible by the analysis of the collected data from WhatsApp’s 
users and the result would strengthen Facebook’s position in the online 
advertising market or sub-segments thereof. Notwithstanding, despite 
introducing advertising on WhatsApp the EC concluded that “there will 
continue to be a sufficient number of other actual and potential competi-
tors who are equally well placed as Facebook to offer targeted advertising”.34 
Finally, the second theory of harm of using WhatsApp as a potential 
source of user data for improving the targeting of Facebook’s advertis-
ing activities outside WhatsApp. Even though the only data WhatsApp 
has on its users is their names and the mobile phone numbers associated 
with the accounts, several respondents, as informed by the EC, expect 
that the increased amount of data which will come under Facebook’s 
control resulting from the deal with WhatsApp will materially reinforce 
Facebook’s position in the provision of online advertising services. 
The EC reasoning was that even if Facebook started to utilise WhatsApp 
user data to improve targeted advertising on Facebook’s social network, 
there will continue to be a significant number of market participants that 
collect user data and that are not within Facebook’s exclusive control as 
Google, Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo!, Twitter, IAC, 
LinkedIn, Adobe and Yelp. In conclusion, the EC considered that the 
Facebook/WhatsApp deal “does not give rise to serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market as regards the market for the provi-
sion of online advertising services, including its potential sub-segments”.35 
34 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 179.
35 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraph 190.
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4.  Questions that have arisen since the EU decision on the WhatsApp 
acquisition by Facebook
Despite the fact that competition authorities started to analyse on a case by 
case basis the possible competition issues that may arise from possession 
and use of data, as concluded by the Autorité de la Concurrence and the 
Bundeskartellamt,36 in the end none were determined in the specific cases. 
Nevertheless, while many internet services are provided for “free” for con-
sumers, in practice they involve the collection of personal data.37 “This has 
spurred new discussions about the role of data in economic relationships 
as well as in the application of competition law to such relationships, in 
particular as regards the assessment of data as a factor of market power”.38
Since the decision of the European Commission (EC) of not opposing to 
the Facebook/WhatsApp deal and declaring it compatible with the inter-
nal market and with the EEA Agreement, some investigations were opened 
by national competition authorities and one investigation by the EC.
In December 2016, the EC addressed a  Statement of Objections  to 
Facebook since it found that, contrary to Facebook’s statements in the 2014 
merger review process, the technical possibility of automatically match-
ing Facebook and WhatsApp users’ identities already existed in 2014, and 
that Facebook’s staff had been aware of such a possibility. In August 2016, 
WhatsApp publicised updates to its terms of service and privacy policy, 
including the possibility of linking WhatsApp users’ phone numbers with 
Facebook users’ identities. 
The EU Merger Regulation39 obliges companies in a merger investigation 
to deliver correct information that is not confusing or false as this is essen-
tial for the EC to review mergers and takeovers in a timely and effective 
manner. This duty applies regardless of whether the information has an 
impact on the ultimate outcome of the merger assessment. 
36 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data. 10th May, 2016, 
3. http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data%20
Papier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
37 “If a market for personal data could be defined in the abstract, the next decisive step would be 
the delineation of the exact boundaries of this market and by that the identification of the relevant 
players in terms of significant competitive interactions”. S. Vezzoso, “Pro-competitive regulation 
of personal data protection in the EU”, in J. Drexl and V. Bagnoli, State-Initiated Restraints of 
Competition (Cheltenham: Edward Elgard, 2015), 2014.
38 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, 10th May, 
2016, 3. 
39 The EC Merger Regulation. Accessed November 11, 2018. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004R0139&from=EN.
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In May 2017 the EC fined Facebook in EUR 110 million for providing 
incorrect or misleading information during the EC’s 2014 investigation 
under the EU Merger Regulation of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp.40 
With respect to all three services the EC carried out its competitive assess-
ment – (i) consumer communications services; (ii) social networking ser-
vices; and (iii) online advertising – also assuming a scenario where auto-
mated user matching would be possible. 
The EC stated that, even in this scenario of matching, its conclusions 
as to the absence of anti-competitive effects of the proposed deal would 
stand.
In Germany the Bundeskartellamt initiated in March 2016 a proceeding 
against Facebook – Facebook Inc., USA, the Irish subsidiary of the com-
pany, and Facebook Germany GmbH, Hamburg – on suspicion of abuse of 
market power by infringing data protection rules with its specific terms of 
service on the use of user data.
The initial suspicion was that Facebook had abused its possibly domi-
nant position in the market for social networks by violating data protec-
tion provisions in the use of unlawful terms and conditions that could 
represent an abusive imposition of unfair conditions on users.
According to the Bundeskartellamt, some indications of market analy-
sis show that Facebook has a dominant market position in the separate 
market for social networks. Through the collection of a large amount of 
personal user data from various sources and the creation of user profiles 
Facebook facilitates its advertising customers on targeting their businesses 
sharply. 
To have access to Facebook social network, users must agree to Facebook’s 
collection and use of their data by accepting the terms of service. Even if 
it can be considered a matter of data protection law, as observed by the 
Bundeskartellamt, “if there is a connection between such an infringement 
and market dominance, this could also constitute an abusive practice 
under competition law”.41
40 “Mergers: Commission fines Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about 
WhatApp takeover”, 2017, under “Press Release Database”, Press-release_IP-17-1369. Accessed 
November 11, 2018. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm.
41 “Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of having abused its 
market power by infringing data protection rules”, 2016, Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016. 
Accessed December 26, 2018. http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/
Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016_Facebook.html?nn=3599398.
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As stated by Mundt: “Dominant companies are subject to special obliga-
tions. These include the use of adequate terms of service as long as these 
are relevant to the market. User data is hugely important for advertising 
financed internet services such as Facebook. For this reason, it is essen-
tial to also examine under the aspect of abuse of market power whether 
the consumers are sufficiently informed about the type and extent of data 
collected”.42
In December 2017, the Bundeskartellamt43 informed Facebook of its pre-
liminary legal assessment in the abuse of dominance proceeding. Based 
on the current stage of the proceedings the Bundeskartellamt assumes 
that Facebook is dominant in the German market for social networks. In 
the view of the competition authority, Facebook is abusing this dominant 
position by making the use of its social network conditional on it being 
allowed to limitlessly amass all kinds of data generated by using third-
party websites44 and merging it with the user’s Facebook account. 
Finally, in February 2019, the Bundeskartellamt imposed on Facebook 
far-reaching restrictions in the processing of user data.45
The decision in Germany covers different data sources: (i) Despite 
Facebook-owned services like WhatsApp and Instagram can continue 
to collect data, the assigning data to Facebook user accounts is subjected 
to the users’ voluntary consent. The non-consent implies the data remain 
with the respective service and cannot be processed in combination with 
Facebook data. (ii) Users must give a voluntary consent to the collecting 
data from third party websites and assigning them to a Facebook user 
account. 
Facebook will have to substantially restrict its collection and combining 
of data when a consent is not given for data from Facebook-owned services 
and third party websites.
42 Ibid.
43 “Preliminary assessment in Facebook proceeding: Facebook’s collection and use of data from third-
praty sources is abusive”, 2017, Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_12_2017. Accessed July 14, 2018. https://
www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_12_2017_
Facebook.html?nn=3591568.
44 According to the Bundeskartellamt the third-party sites include firstly services owned by 
Facebook such as WhatsApp or Instagram, and secondly websites and apps of other operators 
with embedded Facebook APIs.
45 “Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from combining user data from different sources”, 2019. 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_ 
2019_Facebook.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
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According to the Bundeskartellamt, “the extent to which Facebook col-
lects, merges and uses data in user accounts constitutes an abuse of a dom-
inant position”.46
In Italy, in May 2017, the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato (AGCM) fined WhatsApp EUR 3 million for having forced its 
users to share their personal data with Facebook, closing 2 investiga-
tions opened in October 2016 concerning infringements of the Consumer 
Code.47
One investigation alleged that WhatsApp forced its users to accept in 
full the new Terms of Use, specifically the condition to share their per-
sonal data with Facebook. According to the AGCM, WhatsApp induced 
its users to believe that without conceding such approval the service would 
be blocked. The other investigation consisted of an alleged unfair nature 
of some contractual clauses included in WhatsApp’s “Terms of Use” and 
therefore considered the contract terms illicit.
Pitruzzella observed that “larger companies have access to larger data-
sets and therefore can offer more successful services to consumers, which 
in turn allow them to collect even more information and data. This self-
reinforcing mechanism may be similar to a network effect driving market 
concentration”.48
Despite the legal basis of the decisions of AGCM being consumer law, 
the analysis took in account the competition rulings of the EC on Case 
M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp. It is important to consider that AGCM 
plays a role of competition and consumer authority. The Bundeskartellamt 
mentioned in its press release that it had opened the Facebook preceding 
as an infringement of data protection law related with market dominance 
which could represent an abusive conduct under competition law.
As can be observed, the investigations in Germany and in Italy bring 
some challenges for competition authorities which somehow had already 
been mentioned at the Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition. This raises a sus-
picion as to whether the analysis covered all the complexities related to 
46 “Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from combining user data from different sources”, 2019. 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_ 
2019_Facebook.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, 2.
47 “WhatsApp fined for 3 million euro for having forced its users to share their personal data 
with Facebook”, 2017, Press-releases/2380. Accessed June 06, 2017. http://www.agcm.it/en/
newsroom/press-releases/2380-WhatsApp-fined-for-3-million-euro-for-having-forced-its-users-
to-share-their-personal-data-with-facebook.html.
48 G. Pitruzzella, Big Data, Competition and Privacy, 19.
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data in the digital economy. In other words, three main questions have 
arisen since the EC decision on Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition: (i) Did 
the EC apply the best tools to analyse the case?; (ii) Could the EC have 
addressed a decision that would somehow interfere in the privacy field?; 
and (iii) Could the procedures in Germany and Italy had been avoided? 
4.1. Did the EC apply the best tools to analyse the case?
The access to a large volume and variety of data is a competitive advantage 
in the market. Therefore, the collection of data may indicate barriers of 
entrance to new entrepreneurs that are unable to have access to the same 
kind of data as already established companies have, either collecting or 
paying for data.49 
The definition of an additional input market for data is helpful to assess 
the competitive circumstances further than the relevant markets for the 
existing services offered to users and advertisers. This is notable when 
assessing proposed acquisitions and conduct of providers of online plat-
forms under merger and abuse of dominance standards. In this regard, 
while commenting on the acquisition of Nest by Google, approved by the 
US Federal Trade Commission in 2014, Graef concludes that the US FTC 
“would have been able to assess such concerns by defining a relevant mar-
ket for data”.50 
As stated by the EDPS, “the definition of the relevant market is the first 
stage in the legal analysis of cases of anti-competitive agreements, mergers 
and abuse of dominant market position. This allows competition regula-
tors to identify the market operators, that is, suppliers, customers and con-
sumers, and to calculate the total market size and the market share of each 
supplier with reference to the relevant product or service in the relevant 
area”.51 
Taking into account that big data is not an undistinguished pool of data 
since there might be a diverse type of information that satisfies different 
needs of a variety of companies, Pitruzzella states that “the definition of 
49 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, 10th May, 
2016, 11.
50 I. Graef, “Market definition and market power in data: The case of online platforms”, World 
Competition 38, no. 4 (2015): 494.
51 EDPS, “Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor. Privacy and 
Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data. The interplay between data protection, competition law 
and consumer protection in the Digital Economy”, 2014. Accessed December 26, 2018. https://
edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf.
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relevant markets for data prompts the need to undertake a substitutability 
analysis in order to identify a relevant market for data (services) and assess 
the competitive constraint between the parties”.52
The complexity underlying the value chain determines a very varied 
and articulated market scenario for big data where it is not always easy to 
identify the actors participating in the market. “However, the ecosystem of 
big data presents a degree of interconnection between the various parties 
involved making it difficult to identify individual well-defined markets; 
consequently, the resulting complexity determines a scenario in which the 
various segments of the system offer a possible representation, are often 
closely interrelated. This determines a market structure in which (few) 
large multinational companies, characterised by a high degree of verti-
cal, diagonal and horizontal integration in all (or almost all) phases of the 
ecosystem, operate alongside a myriad of small specialized businesses that 
often, after the period of start-up, are acquired by the larger ones”.53
Understanding the whole structure of the relevant market of Big Data 
facilitates comprehending how in fact it works. It determines the players 
acting on each level or stage of the market, if the available data confer a 
significant competitive advantage or even market power for the owner of 
it and if that data is an essential facility to new entrants or for competitors 
that remain in the market.54
The Big Data cycle begins with the generation of data, whether struc-
tured data, such as scientific research, or unstructured data, such as emails 
sent and received. Its goal is the use or consumption of such data, once 
processed into valuable information for companies, retail chains and gov-
ernments, for instance. They use them in many ways, from the develop-
ment of public policies to a competitive advantage to win customers and 
expand market share. Both the beginning and the end of Big Data by anal-
ogy would be the beginning of an economic activity in nature itself, in this 
case data, and it ends with the final consumer, which means the use or 
consumption of the information generated by the Big Data.
52 G. Pitruzzella, Big Data, Competition and Privacy, 20.
53 “Big data: Interim report in the context of the joint inquiry on ‘Big data’ launched by the AGCOM 
deliberation No. 217/17 / CONS17”. Accessed November 27, 2018. https://www.agcom.it/docu-
ments/10179/10875949/Allegato+4-9-2018/f9befcb1-4706-4daa-ad38-c0d767add5fd?version=1.0.
54 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, 10th May, 2016, 
15-16.
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The structure of the Big Data market, therefore, can be segmented into 
three parts where in fact the process of Big Data occurs, namely: (i) Big 
Data capture; (ii) Big Data storage; and (iii) Big Data analytics. In each of 
these phases (or stages or levels) the productive chain or economic activ-
ity that is the Big Data market includes consumers, entrepreneurs, public 
institutions, non-profit organizations, and governments, among others. 
While some of these players are involved in only one or some sectors of 
this market, other competitors are engaged in the whole chain, acting in 
the different stages of the so-called Big Data Relevant Market.
The Big Data Capture is the first level or stage of the Big Data Relevant 
Market, where data is captured, both personal and public data, from the 
use of mechanisms developed for this purpose. This process, sometimes 
called collection, access or acquisition of data is the recording of data that 
goes into a computer system. 
This process of capturing data occurs in all sectors of the economy and 
the data is gathered from a multitude of sources. Some examples of data 
capture are: (i) cell phones companies, which have detailed data about cus-
tomers, including their location and call log; (ii) internet service companies 
that may have access to detailed information of internet usage by its cus-
tomers; (iii) store chains, airlines, and gas stations, which, for example, 
hold their detailed consumer information, such as purchase profiles, from 
cards and loyalty programmes.
The Big Data Storage is the second level or stage of the Big Data Relevant 
Market, where the data captured is stored, and which will be accumu-
lated, aggregated into large quantities, organised and stored in datasets 
for later use. 
A data storage service with enough space (or capacity or volume) needs 
to provide an effective access interface to analyse a large amount of data, 
such as transactions by credit or debit card, accounts, logins, authentic 
details, personal contacts, comments on social networks, posted photos 
and videos, stored for a wide range of providers’ services, such as financial 
institutions and telephone companies, transportation companies, hospi-
tals or medical clinics and government agencies. 
The Big Data Analytics is the third level or stage of the Big Data Relevant 
Market, where the analysis of captured data that has been stored in data-
sets and combined with other information takes place to show trends 
for the analysis and development of profiles, records, macro trends, and 
which is applied for a variety of purposes. In this market, data merges from 
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different public and private sources, such as consumers, companies, insti-
tutions, government agencies, and analytically infer valuable information. 
The potential generated with the aggregation and analysis of data and 
the information obtained may be translated into new opportunities, new 
ideas and new solutions and become a competitive advantage for compa-
nies, leading to market power. Among the traditional players there are 
retailers, providers of management services to clients, software, business 
intelligence systems and loyalty programmes. New players which start to 
operate in the market are companies involved in online advertising, mar-
ket research companies, and experts in data analysis, suppliers and data 
brokers.
The definition of the Big Data Relevant Market55 (or simply BDRM) can 
explain the whole picture of this market in its different stages. In addition, 
“the use of big data is becoming a key way for leading companies to out-
perform their peers”.56 It brings together some awareness regarding market 
power and abuse of dominance as exclusionary practice since the issue is 
competition and goes beyond innovation and welfare. 
Although the definition of Big Data Relevant Market has not been yet 
tested in any case analysed by a competition authority, the accurate analy-
sis of the BDRM in three sub-markets or stages can help evaluate the whole 
market structure more precisely and estimate the undertakings’ market 
power. 
That is even more significant if considered that the information and 
knowledge originated from Big Data is not available to everyone in the 
same amount and quality. The accessibility to these technologies may give 
a competitive surplus to those who hold them. The precise identification 
of the players and their respective shares in the capture, in the storage 
and in the analysis of Big Data can better explain how the BDRM works 
and how concentrated it is. It is important to consider that one player can 
perform its business in only one, in several, or even in the three stages of 
the BDRM.
55 V. Bagnoli, “The big data relevant market”, Concorrenza e Mercato 23 (2016), special number Big 
Data e Concorrenza, 73-94.
56 McKinsey Global Institute, “Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and 
Productivity, May 2011, Report”, 2011, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-
mckinsey/our-insights/big-data-the-next-frontier-for-innovation, 6.
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The BDRM signalises that the Big Data cycle not only deals with overlaps 
on horizontal bases, but also on vertical bases, revealing existing or poten-
tial enhancements of market power and dominance. 
Identifying and understanding the Big Data Relevant Market struc-
ture (Big Data capture, Big Data storage and Big Data analytics) from the 
Competition Law perspective may also lead to better comprehend the per-
formance of companies in the Big Data market and verify precise com-
petition issues such as market power, barriers to entrance and abuses of 
dominance.
The definition of the relevant market is the beginning of any competitive 
analysis. This identifies what product or service people are dealing with, 
which players are in this market, such as producers, distributors and even 
consumers, their interests, the total market size, the existence of barriers 
to entry and the possibility of market power and dominant position. But 
did the EC consider the big data relevant market as a tool for the analysis 
of the Facebook/WhatsApp case?
The EU decision (COMP/M.7217) in the Facebook/WhatsApp deal 
focused on three sectors considered significant, defining the relevant mar-
ket as: (i) consumer communications services; (ii) social networking; and 
(iii) online advertising services; but at the same time showed that an accu-
rate analysis of Big Data was not held since it did not specify what the 
relevant market of Big Data could be.
The EC considered that the merger did not provoke any horizontal over-
laps and analysed the potential data concentration only to the extent of a 
possible strengthening of market position in the online advertising market 
or in any sub-segments thereof, since only Facebook was an active pro-
vider of online advertising services. 
Another two possible theories of harm were raised to verify if Facebook 
could strengthen its position in online advertising by: (i) introducing 
advertising on WhatsApp; and (ii) using WhatsApp as a potential supply 
of user data for the reason of improving Facebook’s advertising activities. 
Regarding the first possible theory of harm the EC concluded that: 
“regardless of whether the merged entity will introduce advertising on 
WhatsApp, there will continue to be a sufficient number of other actual 
and potential competitors who are equally well placed as Facebook to offer 
targeted advertising”.57 Concerning the second possible theory of harm the 
57 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/Whatsapp, paragraph 179.
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reasoning of the EC was that: “regardless of whether the merged entity 
will start using WhatsApp user data to improve targeted advertising on 
Facebook’s social network, there will continue to be a large amount of 
Internet user data that are valuable for advertising purposes and that are 
not within Facebook’s exclusive control”.58 
The relevance of Big Data in merger investigations, as Pitruzzella states, 
is not restricted to how data is negotiated in a market, but includes how 
companies collect and analyse a vast amount of data and use it as an input 
to provide goods/services to end users and companies. “The fact that no 
market for data exists, does not imply that data is an irrelevant factor in 
assessing the effects of a merger. The claim that big data only rarely has 
anything to do with market definition or competitive effects because it 
usually is not traded in market is thus unfounded”.59
The Big Data Relevant Market structure, segmented in Big Data cap-
ture, Big Data storage and Big Data analytics from the Competition Law 
perspective may also lead to better comprehend the performance of com-
panies in the Big Data market and verify competition issues in the deal 
Facebook/WhatsApp more precisely, such as market power, barriers to 
entrance and abuses of dominance.
The EC focused its assessment of consumer communications services 
on apps for smartphones and concluded that Facebook Messenger and 
WhatsApp are not close competitors since Facebook Messenger is a stan-
dalone app integrated with the Facebook social network and WhatsApp 
access is provided through phone numbers. The EC concluded in social 
networking services that the market boundaries are continuously evolving, 
and Facebook and WhatsApp are, if anything, distant competitors in this 
area and competition is unlikely to be negatively affected by the merger. 
Even though WhatsApp is not active in online advertising, the EC reason-
ing was that if Facebook were to introduce advertising on WhatsApp and/
or start collecting WhatsApp user data, the merger would not raise com-
petition concerns. 
Nevertheless, considering that Facebook and WhatsApp were somehow 
competitors at the Big Data Capture stage, since Facebook also performs 
at the segments of Big Data Storage and Big Data Analytics, and pondering 
any strengthens of dominance in online advertising market resulting from 
58 Case no. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/Whatsapp, paragraph 189.
59 G. Pitruzzella, Big Data, Competition and Privacy, 20.
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the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook, it can be considered a vertical 
concentration on the present relevant market of big data. Furthermore, if 
WhatsApp could represent – even if as a potential player – a company to 
capture personal data, it could reinforce Facebook’s performance in online 
advertisement, or the merger itself could simply represent an exclusion of a 
potential competitor of the market.
The EU decision on the Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition could have 
been different if it considered the cycles of the BDRM – capture, storage 
and analysis. 
4.2. Could the EC have addressed a decision that somehow would interfere 
in the privacy field?
In its decision, the EC stated that the deal would raise no competition con-
cerns and authorised the proposed acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook 
ruling that Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp are not close competitors 
and that consumers would continue to have a wide choice of alternatives 
for consumer communications apps after the acquisition. The EC analysed 
potential data concentration issues only to the scope that it could weigh 
down competition in the online advertising market. Any privacy-related 
concerns from the increased concentration of data within the control of 
Facebook because of the deal with WhatsApp is not a matter of the EU 
Competition Law.
Despite its reasoning, or absence of it, of dealing with privacy and con-
sumers matters, should the EC have verified any privacy-related concerns 
from the increased concentration of data, it should have addressed the issue. 
Mergers and acquisitions are ex-ante investigations which count on 
forecasts of the effect of the concentrated entity on the market. Join in 
competition on privacy into enforcement procedures are key answers for 
the competitive analysis of a case. Then, assessing to what extent a con-
centration of two companies competing for the same data would foreclose 
competition or affect the transparency of privacy policies and the motiva-
tion to invest in privacy enhancing technologies could better addressthe 
understanding of such case.
Whereas in Case C-32/11, Allianz Hungaria, the CJEU recognised that 
an infringement of one area of law could possibly be a factor in decid-
ing that there had been a violation of competition law as well and that 
it was possible that a breach of data protection law could constitute an 
infringement of competition law, in Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, the 
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CJEU decided that, concerning the exchange of personal information on 
solvency and credit worthiness, any possible matters relating to the sensi-
tivity of personal data are not an issue for competition law, as they may be 
resolved based on the relevant provisions leading data protection. 
As observed in 2014 by the EDPS, “the Lisbon Treaty has created a posi-
tive obligation on the competition authorities including the Commission 
to uphold fundamental rights, and that privacy protection merited similar 
attention as the preservation of media plurality”.60 
In December 2018, the AGCM announced the decision of an investiga-
tion that had opened in April 2018 for alleged violations of Consumer Law 
by Facebook Ireland Ltd. and its parent company Facebook Inc.61 Facebook 
was considered to be violating Italian Consumer Law for misleading con-
sumers into registering on the Facebook platform while not adequately 
and immediately informing them during the creation of the account that 
the data provided would be used for commercial purposes. 
Facebook emphasised the free nature of the service; however, it was not 
clear about the commercial objectives underlying the provision of the 
social network service for using data to personalise the service and using 
data to carry out advertising campaigns. This induced users into making a 
transactional decision that they probably would not have taken. 
AGCM also considered that Facebook had violated Consumer Law for 
carrying out an aggressive practice, namely the exertion of excessive influ-
ence on registering consumers without express and prior consent and 
the unconscious and automatic transmission of their data to third-par-
ties (websites and apps) for commercial purposes. The total fine amount 
applied to Facebook for those violations was EUR 10 million. 
The Data and Consumer Protection interface was observed by AGCM 
in its decision.62 Even if a company is in compliance with the privacy 
60 EDPS, “Report of EDPS workshop on privacy, consumers, competition and big data”, 2014. 
Accessed December 26, 2018. https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/publications/
reports/report-edps-workshop-privacy-consumers-competition-and_en, 6. 
61 “Facebook fined 10 million Euros by the ICA for unfair commercial practices for using its 




62 AGCM, “PS11112 – Uso dei dati degli utenti a fini commerciali: sanzioni per 10 milioni di euro 
a Facebook”, 2018, datAllegati-news/PS11112. Accessed December 17, 2018. http://www.agcm.it/
dotcmsdoc/allegati-news/PS11112_scorr_sanz.pdf, items 45 and 46. 
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legislation, it shall also comply with the rules on unfair commercial 
practices. The privacy policy guarantees the protection of personal data, 
which is defined as information related to a (physical or legal) person and 
qualified as fundamental rights. It is for the Personal Data Protection 
Authority to apply penalties for data violation. In the field of unfair com-
mercial practices, Consumer Law aims to protect the consumer from eco-
nomic choices induced by deceptive and aggressive practices that are not 
regulated in specific disciplines. Data and Consumer Protection have a 
different scope and pursue distinct interests. Consequently, there is no 
conflict between the two disciplines, rather integrating the same in a 
complementary manner.
The Bundeskartellamt in its decision from February 2019 also high-
lighted data protection provisions as a standard for examining exploita-
tive abuse. In this sense, according to the German Competition Authority, 
Facebook’s terms of service and the manner and extent to which it col-
lects and uses data are in violation of the European data protection rules 
to the detriment of users. Observing the data protection issues involved, 
the Bundeskartellamt concluded, that Facebook’s conduct represents an 
exploitative abuse. “Dominant companies may not use exploitative prac-
tices to the detriment of the opposite side of the market, i.e. in this case 
the consumers who use Facebook. This applies above all if the exploita-
tive practice also impedes competitors that are not able to amass such a 
treasure trove of data. This approach based on competition law is not a 
new one, but corresponds to the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice 
under which not only excessive prices, but also inappropriate contractual 
terms and conditions constitute exploitative abuse (so-called exploitative 
business terms)”63.
EU approaches to data protection, competition and consumer protection 
share common goals, including the promotion of growth, innovation and 
the welfare of individual consumers. This has been stated by the EDPS. 
A closer dialogue between regulators and experts about policy bounda-
ries can not only aid enforcement of rules on competition and consumer 
protection, but also stimulate the market for privacy-enhancing services.64
63 “Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from combining user data from different sources”, 2019. 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_ 
2019_Facebook.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, p. 3
64 “Report of EDPS workshop on privacy, consumers, competition and big data”, 3.
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Competition law has long been of central importance to the EU. It has 
evolved by preventing public obstacles to interstate trade to ensure control 
of corporate mergers and liberalisation of sectors of the public economy. 
Its main aims are to enhance the efficiency of the internal market and the 
welfare of and choice available to consumers. However, the EDPS states 
that the “ultimate purpose of competition law is to ensure that the internal 
market will satisfy all reasonable wishes of consumers for competition, 
including not only the wish for competitive prices but also the wish for 
variety, innovation, quality and other non-price benefits, including pri-
vacy protection”. 
Even if the European Court of Justice has rarely referred to consumer 
welfare in its judgments on competition cases, the interface of Data, 
Consumer and Competition is certainly allowing the EC to address a deci-
sion that can somehow interfere in the privacy field. The “Commission 
[itself] recognizes in its guidelines on enforcement of rules on abuse of 
dominance, welfare is determined not only by price, but also by other fac-
tors, such as quality and consumer choice, which is also a relevant concern 
for data protection”.65 
As stressed by the EDPS, regarding the interfaces between competition 
law, consumer protection and data protection, it is possible to conclude 
that: 
“•  The market for free services in an increasing number of sectors of the 
digital economy has yet to be analysed but clearly power is achieved 
through control over massive volumes of data on service users. 
•  The scope for abuse of market dominance and harm to the consumer 
through refusal of access to personal information and opaque or mis-
leading privacy policies may justify a new concept of consumer harm 
for competition enforcement in digital economy. 
•  Application of competition rules to digital markets has the potential 
to promote privacy-enhancing services and greater consumer control 
over their own data”.66
For this reason, in cases related to mergers such as Facebook/WhatsApp 
analysed by the EC, and if some competition infringement or restriction 
65 “Report of EDPS workshop on privacy, consumers, competition and big data”, 19 (brackets not 
in the original).
66 “Report of EDPS workshop on privacy, consumers, competition and big data”, 26.
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is detected, the Competition Authority shall apply all the remedies con-
sidered possible to address issues related to consumer and data privacy. 
As highlighted by the EDPS, “in competition cases involving firms in the 
digital economy other remedial options could also be considered which 
address the harm to individuals’ privacy”.
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB), in its statement on the 
data protection impacts of economic concentration, observes that the 
increased market concentration in digital markets has the potential to 
threaten the level of data protection and freedom enjoyed by consumers of 
digital services. Considering that independent data protection authorities 
can help with the assessment of potential abuse of dominance as well as 
with company mergers, which may accumulate significant informational 
power, “the identification of conditions or remedies for mitigating nega-
tive impacts on privacy and other freedoms, may be separate to and inde-
pendent from, or integrated into, the analysis carried out by competition 
authorities during their assessment under competition law”.67 
The EC intentions to analyse the effects of further concentration of com-
mercially sensitive data about customers’ personal data in the context of 
its investigation have been strengthened with the proposed acquisition of 
Shazam by Apple. Following the takeover, the EC is concerned that Apple 
would obtain access to commercially sensitive data about customers of its 
competitors for the provision of music streaming services. Access to such 
data could allow Apple to directly target its competitors’ customers and 
encourage them to switch to Apple Music.68 
The EDPB considers it “essential to assess longer-term implications for 
the protection of economic, data protection and consumer rights when-
ever a significant merger is proposed, particularly in technology sectors of 
the economy”.69
As pointed out by the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition in its Position Statement on the EC’s Public consultation on 
Building the European Data Economy, cases in which private actors seek 
access to the data of other actors only for the purpose of strengthening 
67 EDPB, “Statement of the EDPB on the data protection impacts of economic concentration”, 
2018. Accessed December 26, 2018. https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_state-
ment_economic_concentration_en.pdf.
68 “Mergers: Commission opens in depth investigation into Apple’s proposed acquisition of 
Shazam”, 2018, under “Press Release Database”, Press-release_IP-18-3505. Accessed December 26, 
2018. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3505_en.htm.
69 “Statement of the EDPB on the data protection impacts of economic concentration”.
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their own decision making is a very complex issue that constitutes the 
original area of competition policy. However, considering the introduction 
of a data access right for the beneficiaries of the use of devices in which 
sensors are embedded, “access regimes can be conceived provided that 
these regimes are targeted at an identifiable market failure and that they 
will enhance competition”.70
One must observe the challenges as well as the difficulties to enforce 
competition law in each case since these problems are now becoming 
widespread features of digital markets. Drexl71 strongly argues in favour of 
taking additional legislative action outside the realm of competition law, 
yet such legislation should be competition-oriented.
Digital markets are often very dynamic and characterised by high lev-
els of innovation and, at the same time, highly concentrated by a few big 
players. Data, or “Big Data”, can be of great importance and reveal a cen-
tral task for competition authorities in the digital economy which is to 
“keep markets open vis-à-vis powerful or dominant companies to ensure 
that innovative newcomers and smaller competitors have a chance to 
succeed”.72 Explaining the new task of the Bundeskartellamt in consumer 
protection which complements the possibilities of investigating the digi-
tal economy, Mundt73 says that to make consumer protection even more 
effective it would make sense for the competition authority to also obtain 
enforcement powers in this area. To protect competition and consumers, 
the German competition authority will use all its efforts to keep pace with 
the digital economy.
If the competition authority is faced with a situation in which either a 
competitive problem affects privacy or a matter of privacy interferes with 
free competition, it must issue a decision in the field of privacy. In these 
situations, the competition authority often ends up acting as a regulator, 
but always focused on competition issues.
70 J. Drexl, et al., Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 
26 April 2017 on the European Commission’s “Public Consultation on Building the European Data 
Economy”, 13.
71 J. Drexl, Data Access and Control in the Era of Connected Devices Study on Behalf of the European 
Consumer Organisation. Brussels: BEUC, 2018.
72 Andreas Mundt, “Sixty years and still exciting: The Bundeskartellamt in the digital era”, Journal 
of Antitrust Enforcement 6, no. 1 (2018). https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article/6/1/1/4904570.
73 Mundt, “Sixty years and still exciting”, 1-4.
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4.3. Could the procedures in Germany and Italy had been avoided?
While analysing 21st century capitalism, The Economist74 comprehended 
that a revolution is indeed needed to release competition and force down 
the unusually high profits of today to ensure that innovation can thrive 
tomorrow. In the spotlight of these new capitalism companies we can find 
(mainly) Facebook and Google, which provide popular services at no cost 
to consumers but subtly push up the costs of other companies through 
their grip on advertising. 
Facebook, for instance, distorts competition by using the mountains of 
data it collects on users to favour certain partners. It gives them special 
access to its platform and punish rivals perceived as threats by cutting off 
their access. Disclosed documents by a British parliamentary committee 
that is investigating online misinformation show “top executives as they 
worked to cement Facebook’s position as the world’s dominant social 
network”.75 
For sure, competition authorities have a central role to play, especially 
when fighting against market power. The Economist76 pointed out three 
ways to combat market power. One, data and intellectual property regimes 
should be used to booster innovation instead of protecting incumbents. 
Two, governments should remove barriers to entry such as non-compete 
clauses, occupational licensing requirements and complex and needless 
regulations. Three, competition laws must be made to fit the 21st cen-
tury. Regulators need to pay attention to the overall competitive health 
of markets and to returns on capital. Regulators should have enough 
powers to investigate markets that are becoming dysfunctional. “Big tech 
firms should find it much harder to neutralise potential long-term rivals, 
as Facebook did when it acquired Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 
2014”.77
A question that always challenges competition authorities is whether 
to intervene in the dynamic digital markets. In Germany, the 
Bundeskartellamt conducted an abuse proceeding against Facebook for 
74 “The next capitalist revolution”. The Economist, November 15, 2018. https://www.economist.
com/leaders/2018/11/15/the-next-capitalist-revolution?cid1=cust/ednew/n/bl/n/2018/11/15n/
owned/n/n/nwl/n/n/LA/167098/n.
75 “Facebook used people’s data to favor certain partners and punish rivals, documents show”. 
The NY Times, December 05, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/technology/facebook-
documents-uk-parliament.html.
76 “The next capitalist revolution”. The Economist. 
77 “The next capitalist revolution”. The Economist.
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holding a dominant position on the market for social networks and abus-
ing this position by imposing unfair business conditions. Facebook hinges 
the use of its social network on its permission to limitlessly collect all kinds 
of data from third sources and match it with the user’s Facebook account. 
This not only applies to data collected by services owned by Facebook, such 
as WhatsApp, but also to data collected by websites or apps of other opera-
tors that Facebook can access. The proceeding does not concern the collec-
tion and use of data on the Facebook network itself. Having such market 
dominance, Facebook’s users have no appropriate alternative. The extent 
and form of data collection violate mandatory European data protection 
principles. Mundt78 observes that “the case work of competition authori-
ties shows that competition law is generally flexible enough to deal with 
the new issues of digital markets. Nonetheless, we need to think about how 
to refine and sharpen our tool box”.
In Italy, in May 2017, the AGCM considered WhatsApp guilty of hav-
ing forced its users to share their personal data with Facebook. Pitruzzella 
observed that “the extent to which big data is the source of competitive 
advantage and a barrier to entry is not a matter of theory, but an empirical 
question that has to be addressed with regard to individual markets and 
specific circumstances”.79
Since the case was declared by the EC compatible with the internal market 
and with the EEA Agreement, some investigations were opened by compe-
tition authorities. The already mentioned investigations in Germany and 
Italy somehow confirm that the EU decision on the Facebook/WhatsApp 
deal offers some dubious thoughts about how precisely it was taken.
It is important to observe that the EC considered that any privacy-related 
concerns from the increased concentration of data within the control of 
Facebook because of the deal with WhatsApp would be the scope of EU 
data protection rules and not a matter of EU competition law rules. 
In concluding that the increased concentration of data within the con-
trol of Facebook was not a problem for competitive analysis, but rather 
of EU data protection rules, the EC exempted itself from analysing the 
effects on competition arising from such concentration. And, by failing to 
address the issue, the EC failed to prevent competition issues arising from 
any privacy-related concerns related to the increased concentration of data 
78 Mundt, “Sixty years and still exciting”, 1-4.
79 G. Pitruzzella, Big Data, Competition and Privacy, 19.
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affecting consumer law and data protection. Both in Germany and Italy, 
procedures against Facebook/WhatsApp could have been avoided if the 
EC had attempted to deal with the competitive bias of data concentration.
5. Conclusion
The digital economy provides great strides for mankind, especially with 
the use of Big Data. More specifically in the competition field, Big Data is 
an important competitive advantage for those companies who own it and 
can, consequently, extract the best results from its use.
Due to the relevance of Big Data as a competitive advantage, several 
acquisitions have occurred and are occurring in the digital markets, prob-
ably focusing on the concentration of Big Data.
This new reality has fostered an issue that competition authorities are 
still learning how to deal with and apply in the respective cases. The acqui-
sition of WhatsApp by Facebook is an example of the need for competition 
authorities to be aware of this new reality and to find the appropriate tools 
to address the existing and emerging peculiarities and interfaces.
The EU decision on the Facebook/WhatsApp case could have been dif-
ferent if it had considered the cycles of the BDRM – capture, storage and 
analysis. Furthermore, the decision could have been different if WhatsApp 
had been considered a player to capture personal data which could rein-
force Facebook’s performance/dominance in online advertisement. The 
decision could also have been different if the acquisition of WhatsApp 
itself were understood as an exclusion of a competitor of the market.
If the competition authority is faced with a situation in which a competi-
tive problem affects privacy or if a privacy issue restricts free competition, 
it must rule a decision even if it interferes with the field of privacy. In these 
situations, the competition authority ends up acting as a regulator focused 
on competition.
Preventing competition issues arising from any privacy-related con-
cerns from the increased concentration of data that can affect consumer 
law and data protection is a duty of competition authorities. If the EC had 
attempted to deal with the competitive bias of data concentration, both in 
Germany and Italy, procedures against Facebook/WhatsApp could have 
been avoided.
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